Governance and Institutional Model

• Proposed
• Existing
• Not yet authorized

Everything the bridge would build is proposed. The institutions it would cooperate with, and the laws it would operate under, exist today. And nothing described here has been authorized by any authority in either country — the legend is applied throughout this page.

The pilot vehicle would be an independent U.S. 501(c)(3) public charity, optionally incubated under an established fiscal sponsor for speed while its own exemption is pending. At maturity the proposal is a hybrid: the 501(c)(3) platform for research, diaspora programs, and philanthropy, alongside a 501(c)(6) membership arm or taxable subsidiary for corporate dues, event revenue, and fee-for-service export assistance. This mirrors how bilateral business councils actually fund themselves — membership and earned revenue, not government appropriations.

Independence is the design center, not an afterthought: a standalone entity can hold staff, contracts, and grants; borrow the credibility of existing bodies through formal partnership without merging with them; and keep its governance accountable to its own board rather than to any sponsor.

No entity has been formed. No incorporation, application, or fiscal-sponsorship discussion has begun.

The proposed role of the Royal Hashemite Court is strategic sponsorship only — patronage without governance. Modeled on independent-trustee royal foundations, the Court would convene and lend visibility; it would not appoint directors, direct programs, or fund operations. At concept stage this means no Court money, no Court staff, and no Court direction — a posture chosen for both constitutional and U.S. legal reasons.

The constitutional fit is Jordan's own demonstrated pattern: the Economic Modernisation Vision was launched from the Royal Hashemite Court and is executed by the government through ministerial programs, with commercial activity resting constitutionally with the Cabinet and the private sector. The bridge proposes the same split — Royal convening, independent execution.

The Court has not seen, considered, or been approached about this concept document. Naming the proposed role here is a design statement, not a description of any existing relationship.

• An independent chair — a U.S. figure of standing with no employment or contractual tie to any funder.
• A private-sector majority of at least 60% of board seats is proposed.
• Diaspora seats including at least one youth seat and one seat anchored in the healthcare or technology corridors.
• Jordanian institutional participation without control: non-voting or separately capped seats, and a hard rule that no single institution — and no combination of state-linked entities — may hold voting control or a board majority.
• Advisory councils for trade, health, academia, and diaspora youth — reputational assets that advise but never govern.
• Term limits for the chair and directors, staggered board refresh, annual conflict-of-interest disclosure, and recusal rules enforced by the independent committee.

The board described is a target composition for a proposal, not a slate. No directors have been identified or approached.

The safeguards below are proposed as binding policy from day one — published on the entity's site, audited annually, and enforced by the independent committee of the board. They exist to answer, in advance, the two questions any serious reader asks: who controls this, and whose money is it.

• An annual independent audit, with audited financials and the public IRS filing published on the website.
• Bilingual annual reporting — the same disclosure in Arabic and English, with the same force.
• Board-approved, comparability-documented executive compensation.
• No funding conditioned on programmatic control; any engagement touching a foreign government principal receives standing legal review.
• Anti-politicization: lobbying limits respected, no electoral activity of any kind.

U.S. foreign-agent registration law has no blanket exemption for nonprofits. The dangerous combination is foreign-government funding combined with political or quasi-commercial activity — which is precisely why the proposed structure excludes it: an independent board setting its own agenda, arm's-length funding with caps and disclosure, and no direction from the Royal Hashemite Court or any government. Any arrangement that would involve Court funding, staff, or direction — including any step beyond presenting this concept — would be reviewed by counsel before it is entered into. A counsel memo is the first milestone of Phase 0 on the Roadmap page.

This paragraph is a design posture, not legal advice. No counsel has been engaged.

Three envelopes, each carrying estimate chips and the scenario line. They are planning arithmetic built from comparable organizations, not budgets — there is nothing to budget against, because no funding exists.

Financing principle: no Royal or government financing is assumed at any stage. The pilot would be seeded by philanthropy and anchor private sponsors; at maturity the platform is designed to run predominantly on membership, sponsorship, and earned revenue — At maturity, at least 70% of revenue would be private or earned under the proposed financing mix. If suitable private funding cannot be secured, this site continues to state plainly that no funding exists.

A diaspora platform lives or dies on whether its members believe their data is safe from misuse. The proposed charter is deliberately stricter than the minimum legal bar:

• Granular, opt-in consent to a GDPR-grade standard — no bundled permissions, no dark patterns.
• U.S. data residency; no bulk data export.
• No sharing with any government absent legal compulsion, and public notice of any such compulsion to the extent legally possible.
• A published transparency report and an independent privacy trustee outside the operating team.

The charter is designed to align with Jordan's own data-protection baseline: Jordan's first data-protection law (No. 24 of 2023) entered into force in March 2024.